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ANOTHER VIEWPOINT (AVP)
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Israel and Palestine: Alternatives to Violence
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The violence in Israel against civilians in the last few weeks has been depl Only ultra fanatics and blood thirsty people would condone attacks on civilians and innocent people, as has been happening in Israel in recent weeks. Israel's reaction been to declare a war on the perpetrators, which means more violence; only this time be against Palestinians. World leaders are rushing to a summit meeting in Egypt to condemn terrorism and give backing to Israel. Various policy proposals have been suggested to combat violence, such as: putting pressure on President Arafat to rein killers; imposing more tight security by Israel; pursuing and apprehending the suspe terrorists wherever they are; pressuring Arab countries and Iran to reduce support f protection of the extremist groups; and, in the worst case, suspending the peace pro between Israel and the Palestinians indefinitely.

These policies will not succeed in combatting attacks by Hamas and Islamic J or by Israeli extremists. Not only are these policies difficult to implement, but th deal with the causes of continuing violence. Implementation will be difficult becau perpetrators are not easily identifiable. The Palestinian police is not equipped wel to smash a popular movement without inciting a deadly civil war among Palestinians. international attempts to pressure other countries to reduce their support for terro are more rhetorical than operative. Israel, with all its power, has not been able to the suicide attacks; how can the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) do so? The Un States, with all its might, has not been able to influence Iran's policy in the Midd why should it succeed now? Furthermore, most of the proposed measures seem one-sided they aim at disarming Palestinians but not Israelis, containing Palestinian extremis but not Israeli groups, and punishing Palestinian violence more severely than Israel violence. Therefore, it is unlikely that these approaches will put an end to violenc

A more serious problem with these measures is that they do not deal with the of the continuing conflict and the declared grievances of the militant groups. For e there are charges that implementation of the peace process has been too slow and tha parties to that process have failed to deliver what was expected of them. On the Pa side, economic conditions remain desperate, unemployment is rampant, social and poli freedoms remain curtailed, and foreign influence is on the rise. In the meantime, ai promised to the Palestinians is being doled out in instalments that are barely enoug survival of the Arafat regime. On the Israeli side, Israel has grabbed about a third territory than was allocated to it by the United Nations; it continues to occupy Syr Lebanese lands; it continues to drag its feet in the withdrawal of its occupation fo the West Bank and Gaza; it continues to exploit Palestinian resources; and large nu of administratively-held Palestinians are still in prison. Furthermore, Israeli po opening and closing the borders between the Palestinian and Israeli entities contin erratic and heartless, as if the workers who commute to Israel for survival do not c Therefore, the most promising way to reduce violence is to expedite implementation o peace process and remove the underlying causes of violence. Four major steps may be recommended:

First, Israel can and should complete withdrawal of its forces from all the territories as soon as possible, thus removing the argument that the withdrawal is incomplete or not genuine.

Second, Israel can and should release all political prisoners and send them without delay. As long as they are held hostage, there is little that can convince and other extremist groups of the honesty or good will of the Israeli government in reaching a genuine peace with the Palestinians.

Third, Israel can and should stop promoting, officially and unofficially, ec

and social programs that aim directly or indirectly, to force integration of the Pal economy with those of Israel, Jordan, and other countries. These programs, though t may have an element of good will toward the Palestinians, can only be perceived as w of controlling the Palestinian entity and diminishing its newly created identity as independent people.

Fourth, and most important, Israel can and should implement full separation between the two entities: Israel should stop acting as a big brother or as an occupy power over the Palestinians. Israel still controls large segments of the Palestina economy, polity, and communication system. Such a relationship would undermine the value of autonomy and prevent the Palestinians from taking charge of their own domes affairs as fully as they should.

The proposed programs and policies for integration tend to be patronizing an restrictive, and serve mainly to keep the Palestinians under control. To illustrat the Israeli job market open to Palestinian labor sustains the latter's dependence on To make aid to Palestine conditional upon some form of integration with Jordan or Is deprives the Palestinians of the freedom to manage their own economy and choose thei partners in any cooperative or integrative program. Industrial zones on the borders Israel could lead to a system of Bantustan which assures cheap labor for foreign ow industrial capital. These various programs can be counterproductive. In place of the policies, Israel and Palestine should explore total separation between them at least cooling off and reorganization period.

Total separation between Israel and Palestine will have several positive eff would reduce insecurity and leave less room for violence by extremist groups and red the costs of security in Israel. It will also give Israel a chance to do without Pal cheap labor and an assured market for some of its products. On the other hand, sepa would give the Palestinians a challenge to rebuild their economy, rehabilitate their and establish economic and social relations with other countries as they see fit. T would have the opportunity to deal with international agencies as an independent par rather than as adjunct to Israeli or Jordanian interests.

Israeli critics of the peace process may argue that separation would be a st a Palestinian state. That, however, is a matter of semantics. The permanent relatio between Israel and Palestine are subject to negotiation. Palestinian critics of the process may charge cruelty if Israel closes its borders to commuting labor. It is hi for the Palestinians to realize that autonomy and independence entail responsibility reliance and that Israel has no obligation to keep Palestinian labor employed.

The proposed policy of total separation is not immutable. Once Israel and P have adjusted to their new positions they may choose to gradually lift the barriers, new relations, or even open the borders for totally free mobility between them. Such voluntary measures would be true expressions of willingness and readiness to coopera with each other. In that case there would be no room for enmity or violence.

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