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Giacomo Bonanno
Working Papers
You can download an electronic copy
of each of the following Working Papers in PDF
format
Giacomo Bonanno, Belief change in branching time:
AGM-consistency and iterated revision
Abstract.
We study belief change in branching-time structures. First, we identify
a property of branching-time frames that is equivalent to AGM-consistency,
which is defined as follows. A frame is AGM-consistent if the partial belief
revision function associated with an arbitrary state-instant pair and an
arbitrary model based on that frame can be extended to a full belief revision
function that satisfies the AGM postulates. Second, we provide a set of
modal axioms that characterize the class of AGM-consistent frames within
the modal logic introduced in [Bonanno, G., Axiomatic characterization
of AGM belief revision in a temporal logic, Artificial Intelligence,
171 (2007), 144-160]. Third, we introduce a generalization of AGM belief
revision functions that allows a clear statement of principles of iterated
belief revision and discuss iterated revision both semantically and syntactically.
To download the files in pdf format click
here: plausibility.pdf
Giacomo Bonanno, A characterization of sequential
equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision
Abstract.
In [G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, Artificial Intelligence,
2009] a semantics for one-stage AGM belief revision was proposed based
on choice frames, borrowed from the rational choice literature. In this
paper we extend the semantics of choice frames to deal with iterated belief
revision and use the corresponding structures to analyze extensive-form
games. Choice frames can be used to represent a player's initial beliefs
and disposition to change those beliefs when informed that it is her turn
to move. If the frame satisfies AGM-consistency and a natural postulate
for iterated belief revision, then it is rationalizable by a total pre-order
on the set of histories. We show that three properties of this total pre-order,
together with the hypothesis of agreement among players, provide a characterization
of the notion of consistent assessment, which is the central component
of the notion of sequential equilibrium proposed by Kreps and Wilson [Econometrica,
1982].
To download the files in pdf format click
here: ibr_se.pdf
Giacomo Bonanno, Two lectures on the epistemic foundations
of game theory
Abstract.
These are the slides of two lectures on the Epistemic Foundations
of Game Theory, delivered at the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences (KNAW), February 8, 2007.
To download the files in pdf format click
here: Lecture 1.pdf , Lecture
2.pdf
Giacomo Bonanno (with Klaus Nehring), Agreeing
to disagree: a survey.
To download the paper in pdf format click
here: agree.pdf
Some of the material in this paper was published in: Giacomo Bonanno
and Klaus Nehring, “How to make sense of the common prior assumption under
incomplete
information", International Journal
of Game Theory, 28 (3), August 1999, pp. 409-434 (To download the paper
in pdf format click here: common.pdf)
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