Department of Economics, University of California, Davis Ecn 200C - Micro Theory - Professor Giacomo Bonanno

## ANSWERS TO PRACTICE PROBLEMS

## 1.

First we have to check, for each type of consumer which package the consumer would choose.

|  | willingness to pay for 50 units (package 1) | cost of package 1 | surplus from package 1 | willingness to pay for 40 units (package 2) | cost of package | surplus from package 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Type 1 | area under demand curve from 0 to 50 $\frac{100(50)}{2}=2500$ | 2,500 | 0 | area under demand curve from 0 to 40 $=2,400$ | 2,200 | 200 |
| Type 2 | $\begin{gathered} \text { area under } \\ \text { demand curve } \\ \text { from } 0 \text { to } 50 \text { (note } \\ \text { when } Q=50, \\ P=30) \text { : } \\ \frac{(80-30) 50}{2}+30(50) \\ =2,750 \end{gathered}$ | 2,500 | 250 | area under demand curve from 0 to 40 $=2,400$ | 2,200 | 200 |

Thus type 1 consumers choose package 2 and type 2 consumers choose package 1 .
The profit (gross of fixed cost) from a type 1 consumer (i.e. from a package 2 ) is: $2,200-10(40)=1,800$.

The profit (gross of fixed cost) from a type 2 consumer (i.e. from a package 1 ) is: $2,500-10(50)=2,000$.

Thus total profits are: $100(1,800)+50(2,000)-200($ fixed cost $)=\$ 279,800$.

## 2.

POLICY 1: When $\mathrm{P}=17$, a type 1 consumer buys 8 units and a type 2 consumer buys 8 units. Thus the firm's profits are: $n[(17)(8)-8]+n[(17)(8)-8]=\mathbf{2 5 6} \boldsymbol{n}$

POLICY 2: When $P=13$, a type 1 consumers buys 10 units and a type 2 consumer buys 12 units. Thus the firm's profits are: $n[(13)(10)-10]+n[(13)(12)-12]=\mathbf{2 6 4} \boldsymbol{n}$

POLICY 3. For each consumer, the willingness to pay for 12 units is given by the area under the demand curve between 0 and 12 and the willingness to pay for 8 units is given by the area under the demand curve between 0 and 8 . Thus

|  | willingness <br> to pay for 12 <br> units <br> (package 1) | willingness <br> to pay for 8 <br> units <br> (package 2) | cost of <br> package <br> 1 | cost of <br> package <br> 2 | surplus from <br> package 1 | surplus from <br> package 2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TYPE 1 | 252 | 200 | 220 | 136 | 32 | $\mathbf{6 4}$ |
| TYPE 2 | 228 | 168 | 220 | 136 | 8 | $\mathbf{3 2}$ |

Thus both types end up choosing package 2. It follows that the firm's profits are: $2 n(136-8)=$ $256 n$.

POLICY 4. For each consumer, the willingness to pay for 16 units is given by the area under the demand curve between 0 and 16 and the willingness to pay for 12 units is given by the area under the demand curve between 0 and 12. Thus

|  | willingness <br> to pay for 16 <br> units <br> (package 1) | willingness <br> to pay for 12 <br> units <br> (package 2) | cost of <br> package <br> 1 | cost of <br> package <br> 2 | surplus from <br> package 1 | surplus from <br> package 2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TYPE 1 | 272 | 252 | 264 | 243 | 8 | $\mathbf{9}$ |
| TYPE 2 | 272 | 228 | 264 | 243 | $\mathbf{8}$ | -15 |

Thus type 1 consumers choose package 2 and type 2 consumers choose package 1 . It follows that the firm's profits are: $n(243-12)+n(264-16)=\mathbf{4 7 9 n}$.

Clearly, the best policy for the firm is policy 4.

