




*proper subgame but not minimal*



**MINIMAL PROPER SUBGAME**

# SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM






		2					
		g		h			
1	D	4	3	0	2	0	2
	E	2	0	1	3	1	1

Player 3: L

		2					
		g		h			
1	D	0	2	1	1	1	0
	E	2	1	2	0	1	2

Player 3: R

Nash equilibrium: (E, g, R)



**Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of the original game:**

In the original game:

Strategy of Player 1: BE


i. Player 2: bcg

ii. Player 3: fR



Subgame-perfect equilibrium


$(BE, bcg, fR)$

strategy profile for original game




BI: (A, D, F)





**Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium of the original game:**

# SUBGAME-PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM



Is (D, h, L)  
a N.E. of  
this subgame?


No

Is (E, h, L)  
a N.E.?

No :

1 and 2 happy  
3 unhappy

## There may be no subgame-perfect equilibria



		3	
		e	f
2	c	1 0	0 1
	d	0 1	1 0


No N.E.

Hence the entire game does not have any subgame-perfect equilibria

SPE: a N.E. of the entire game that remains a N.E. in every subgame



# There may be no subgame-perfect equilibria



✓ ✓ ✓  
 $(B, c, f)$  is a N.E.

not subgame perfect  
 because  $(c, f)$  is  
 not a N.E. of  
 the subgame

because  $c$  is not  
 a best reply to  
 $f$  for Player 2

Another N.E. is


$(B, d, e)$  also not SPE because

$(d, e)$  not  
 NE  
 of

SPE: a N.E. of the entire game



that remains a N.E. in every  
 subgame

There may be several subgame-perfect equilibria



$(c, e)$  a N.E. of subgame

$(d, f)$  is also a NE of subgame



SPE:  $(B, c, e)$

$(A, d, f)$

**Set of NE = set of SPE in the class of games that ...**

have no  
proper  
subgames