





# Multiple backward-induction solutions



## Bargaining game between Ali and Baba.

They have \$100 to divide. Ali makes an offer to Baba. Offers can only be multiples of \$25. The minimum offer is \$25. Baba can accept or reject. If he rejects the money to be divided shrinks to \$50 and he makes an offer. If Ali rejects then they both get nothing. Thus only two rounds of offers.



Selfish

$$U_A(\$75, \$25) = 75$$


$$U_A(\$50, \$50) = 50$$

$$U_B(\$75, \$25) = 25$$

$$U_B(\$50, \$50) = 50$$


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**Definition:** A strategy for player  $i$  in a perfect-information game is a list of choices, one for each node that belongs to player  $i$ .

For Player 1 :  $( \_ )$  A, B  
 ↖ either A or B



A strategy for Player 2:


- if Player 1 plays A then ...
- " " " B " "

$( \_ , \_ )$  (C, E)  
 (C, F)  
 (D, E)  
 (D, F)  
 ↖ either C or D      ↖ either E or F

		CE	CF	DE	DF
1	A	2, 2	2, 2	4, 0	4, 0
	B	3, 1	0, 1	3, 1	0, 1

Nash equilibria are:

(B, CE) and (A, CF)



Only one BI solution  
 (In, Acc)

		M	
		fight	Accumulate
PE	In	0, 0	(2, 2)
	Out	(1, 5)	1, 5

Two N.E. :  
 (In, Acc.)

(Out, Fight) reject  
 this NE


because it incorporates  
 an incredible  
 threat ("if In I will  
 fight")



2 BI solutions

(AJM, DE)

(BSM, DE)



How many strategies does Player 2 have? 6

(—, —)  
 ↑            ↑  
 C or D       E, F, G

(C, E), (C, F), (C, G)

(D, E), (D, F), (D, G)

$2 \times 3 \times 2 = 12$

(—, —, —)  
 A or B    H or J or K    L or M

Is AD a BI solution?  
 No but it is the outcome of the BI solution (AJM, DE)