IDSDS. *The Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies*

		Player 2					
		D		***E***		***F***	
Player 1	***A***	8	6	0	9	3	8
	B	3	2	2	1	4	3
	C	2	8	1	5	3	1

IDSDS. *The Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies*

		Player 2					
		D		***E***		***F***	
Player 1	***A***	8	6	0	9	3	8
	B	3	2	2	1	4	3
	C	2	8	1	5	3	1

IDWDS. *The Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies*

		Player 2	
		L	R
Player 1	A	4, 0	0, 0
	T	3, 2	2, 2
	M	1, 1	0, 0
	B	0, 0	1, 1

IDWDS. *The Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies*

		Player 2	
		L	R
Player 1	A	4, 0	0, 0
	T	3, 2	2, 2
	M	1, 1	0, 0
	B	0, 0	1, 1

IDWDS. *The Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies*

Player 1	Player 2: L	Player 2: R
A	4, 0	0, 0
T	3, 2	2, 2
M	1, 1	0, 0
B	0, 0	1, 1

Nash equilibrium

		Player 2					
		D		*E*		*F*	
Player 1	*A*	1	0	2	3	3	1
	B	3	3	1	5	4	4
	C	3	2	0	1	3	0

		Player 2					
		C			D		
Player 1	A	2	2	2	4	3	6
	B	5	3	2	3	4	2

Player 3 chooses F

		Player 2					
		C			D		
	T	0	0	0	1	2	5
	B	3	6	1	0	0	1

Player 3 chooses G

Nash equilibrium

		Player 2					
		D		*E*		*F*	
Player 1	*A*	1	0	2	3	3	1
	B	3	3	1	5	4	4
	C	3	2	0	1	3	0

		Player 2					
		C			D		
Player 1	A	2	2	2	4	3	6
	B	5	3	2	3	4	2

Player 3 chooses F

		Player 2					
		C			D		
	T	0	0	0	1	2	5
	B	3	6	1	0	0	1

Player 3 chooses G

Large game.

150 students in a class, they simultaneously ask for a grade (A, B or C); if 20% or less (i.e. ≤ 30) ask for an A then all requests are granted, otherwise they all get a C.

Example with uncertain outcomes. A simple auction. There are two players, Charlie and Doreen. There is an object (e.g. a painting) which Charlie values at $120 and Doreen values at $180. Each player has to submit a bid of either $50 or $80. The highest bidder gets the object and pays his/her bid (the loser does not pay anything). If the bids are equal, a fair coin is tossed.

Outcomes:
a Charlie wins and pays $50

b Charlie wins and pays $80

c Doreen wins and pays $50

d Doreen wins and pays $80

Player's utility = value – price paid (if wins, otherwise 0)

Doreen (value: $180)

		bid $50	bid $80
Charlie	bid $50		
(value: $120)	bid $80		

Outcomes:
- *a* Charlie wins and pays \$50
- *b* Charlie wins and pays \$80
- *c* Doreen wins and pays \$50
- *d* Doreen wins and pays \$80

Player's utility = value – price paid (if wins, otherwise 0)

Doreen (value: \$180)

		bid \$50	bid \$80
Charlie	bid \$50	$\begin{pmatrix} b & d \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$	d
(value: \$120)	bid \$80	b	$\begin{pmatrix} b & d \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$

		Doreen	
		bid $50	bid $80
Charlie	bid $50	35 , 65	0 , 100
	bid $80	40 , 0	20 , 50