## Department of Economics, University of California, Davis Ecn 122 – Game Theory – Professor Giacomo Bonanno

## HOMEWORK # 1 (for due date see web page)

**1.** Consider the following three-player game-frame (where o1, o2,...,o18 are the possible outcomes):

		Play	er 1	A B C	D 01 04 07		yer 2 E 52 55 58 67 3: C	F 03 06 09		
Player 1				D		yer 2 E	F			
		er 1	A B C	010 013 016	0	11 14 17	012 015 018			
					Player 3: H					
The players				lows	5:					
		, <i>o</i> 16	best							
	04,014 015				( o13					best
Player 1: {	o1,o12							o5,014		o est
	09			Player 2:				<i>o</i> 1, <i>o</i> 7, <i>o</i> 11		
	<i>o</i> 5, <i>o</i> 13							<i>o</i> 6, <i>o</i> 12		
	02						(	02,08,017		
	<i>o</i> 11, <i>o</i> 18					03	8,04,09	9, <i>0</i> 10, <i>0</i> 15,	<i>o</i> 16, <i>o</i> 18	worst
	06									
	03,08,	<i>o</i> 10, <i>o</i> 17	worst							
			Player 3	0	012 015 03,06,010 011 02,07,014,0 8,010,013, 01,04,05,0	o17 o18	best worst			

- (a) For each player write a utility function that represents her ranking, using consecutive integers with 0 being the lowest. Use these utility functions to obtain a game based on the above game-frame.
- (b) For each player find all the strategies that are strictly dominated.
- (c) What do you get by applying the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies?
- (d) Are there any Nash equilibria?
- 2. Consider the following game (*x* and *y* can be any non-negative real numbers):

		Player 2							
		F	G	Н					
P 1	А	2,4	2,3	0,3					
a	В	2,1	3,4	1,0					
y e	С	3,2	4,2	2 , <b>y</b>					
r	D	<b>x</b> , 3	3,4	1,4					
1	Е	1,2	3,2	0,1					

- (a) For what values of x does Player 1 have a strictly dominant strategy? Name the strategy.
- (b) For what values of x does Player 1 have a weakly but not strictly dominant strategy? Name the strategy.
- (c) Are there values of y for which Player 2 has a weakly dominant strategy?
- (d) Find all the Nash equilibria when x = 1 and y = 2.
- (e) Find all the Nash equilibria when x = 4 and y = 2.
- (f) Let x = 4 and y = 3. What do you get when you apply the procedure of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies? Write explicitly the various steps of the elimination procedure.