## CASE 2.2: risk aversion

Smaller example.

Changes in wealth:

$$
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text { probability } & \frac{2}{9} & \frac{4}{9} & \frac{3}{9} \\
\text { state } \rightarrow & s_{1} & s_{2} & s_{3} \\
\text { act } \downarrow & & & \\
a & \$ 21 & \$ 0 & \$ 156 \\
b & \$ 0 & \$ 125 & \$ 0 \\
c & \$ 96 & \$ 0 & \$ 69
\end{array}
$$

Assume: $U(\$ x)=\sqrt{x}$ and initial wealth is $\$ 100$. Then

| probability | $\frac{2}{9}$ | $\frac{4}{9}$ | $\frac{3}{9}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| state $\rightarrow$ | $s_{1}$ | $s_{2}$ | $s_{3}$ |
| act $\downarrow$ |  |  |  |
| $a$ | $\$ 121$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 256$ |
| $b$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 225$ | $\$ 100$ |
| $c$ | $\$ 196$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 169$ |


| probability | $\frac{2}{9}$ | $\frac{4}{9}$ | $\frac{3}{9}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| state $\rightarrow$ | $s_{1}$ | $s_{2}$ | $s_{3}$ |
| act $\downarrow$ |  |  |  |
| $a$ | $\$ 121$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 256$ |
| $b$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 225$ | $\$ 100$ |
| $c$ | $\$ 196$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 169$ |

STEP 1. If she does not purchase information.

$$
\mathbb{E}[U(a)]=
$$

$\mathbb{E}[U(b)]=$
$\mathbb{E}[U(c)]=$

Thus she will choose
with an expected utility of

| probability | $\frac{2}{9}$ | $\frac{4}{9}$ | $\frac{3}{9}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| state $\rightarrow$ | $s_{1}$ | $s_{2}$ | $s_{3}$ |
| act $\downarrow$ |  |  |  |
| $a$ | $\$ 121$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 256$ |
| $b$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 225$ | $\$ 100$ |
| $c$ | $\$ 196$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 169$ |

STEP 2. If she purchases information $\left\{\left\{s_{1}, s_{2}\right\},\left\{s_{3}\right\}\right\}$ at price $p$.

- If informed that $\left\{s_{1}, s_{2}\right\}$ then the revised decision problem is:

| probability |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| state $\rightarrow$ | $S_{1}$ | $S_{2}$ |
| act $\downarrow$ |  |  |
| $a$ | $\$ 121$ | $\$ 100$ |
| $b$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 225$ |
| $c$ | $\$ 196$ | $\$ 100$ |

$\mathbb{E}[U(a)]=$
$\mathbb{E}[U(b)]=$

$$
\mathbb{E}[U(c)]=
$$

Thus she will choose
with an expected utility of

| probability | $\frac{2}{9}$ | $\frac{4}{9}$ | $\frac{3}{9}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| state $\rightarrow$ | $s_{1}$ | $s_{2}$ | $s_{3}$ |
| act $\downarrow$ |  |  |  |
| $a$ | $\$ 121$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 256$ |
| $b$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 225$ | $\$ 100$ |
| $c$ | $\$ 196$ | $\$ 100$ | $\$ 169$ |

- If informed that $\left\{s_{3}\right\}$ then she will choose with a utility of

$$
\text { probability } \begin{array}{llll}
\frac{2}{9} & \frac{4}{9} & \frac{3}{9}
\end{array}
$$

Given the initial probabilities: state $\rightarrow \begin{array}{lllll} & s_{1} & s_{2} & s_{3}\end{array}$ the probability of receiving information $\left\{s_{1}, s_{2}\right\}$ is $\frac{6}{9}=\frac{2}{3}$ and the probability of receiving information $\left\{s_{3}\right\}$ is $\frac{1}{3}$. Thus the expected utility of purchasing information at price $p$ is:

For example, if $p=\$ 30$ then
The maximum price the DM is willing to pay for information is given by the solution to:

Which is

## Future Value and Present Value

- \$100 today, or
- \$200, 5 years from now

Reasons for preferring \$100 today:

Rephrase the choice as:

- \$100 today, but cannot be spent until 5 years from now, or
- \$200, 5 years from now


Definition: the future value of $\$ x, n$ periods from now is

$$
x(1+r)^{n}
$$

where $r$ is the interest rate per period $r$.

- If $r=0.10$ (i.e. $10 \%$ ) then the future value of $\$ 100$ five years from now is
- If $r=0.15$ (i.e. $15 \%$ ) then the future value of $\$ 100$ five years from now is

Definition: the present value $\boldsymbol{y}$ of $\$ x$ available $n$ periods from now is the solution to

- If $r=0.10$ (i.e. $10 \%$ ) then the present value of $\$ 200$ five years from now is
- If $r=0.15$ (i.e. $15 \%$ ) then the present value of $\$ 200$ five years from now is
$r$ is the interest rate, $\delta=\frac{1}{1+r}$ is the discount factor. Thus the present value of $\$ x$ available $n$ periods from now is also denoted by $x \delta^{n}$.

Note that $\frac{1}{(1+r)^{n}}=\left(\frac{1}{1+r}\right)^{n}=\delta^{n}$.

Above we calculated the present value of a sum of money. We can also calculate the present value of a stream of payments:


So the present value of that income stream is

This is a sum of money that is equivalent to that income stream. Equivalent in what sense?

Suppose that $r=12 \%$ (the present is date 0 ):

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text { date } 2 & \text { date } 3 & \text { date } 5 \\
\$ 2,000 & \$ 3,000 & \$ 3,500
\end{array}
$$

The present value of $\$ 2,000$ available at date 2 is
the present value of $\$ 3,000$ available at date 3 is
the present value of $\$ 3,500$ available at date 5 is

Put these three sums of money in three different accounts

CD1 (principal: \$1,594.39)

CD2 principal: $\$ 2,135.34$ )

CD3 (principal: \$1,985.99).

After two years (at date 2) close account CD1: the balance is

After three years (at date 3) close account CD2: the balance is

After five years (at date 5) close account CD3: the balance is

What if instead of sums of money we are considering other outcomes? For example, your boss might offer you a 1-week vacation now or a 2 -week vacation a year from now. Can we compute the "present value" of a 2 -week vacation a year from now? The answer is obviously No.

Then how useful is the notion of present value in allowing us to think about intertemporal choices? The answer is: it merely suggests an analogy.

## The discounted utility model

$Z=\left\{z_{1}, z_{2}, \ldots, z_{m}\right\}$ set of basic outcomes $T=\{0,1,2, \ldots, n\}$ a set of dates
$t=0$ is now, $\quad t=1$ is one period from now $\ldots$

## $(z, t)$ : outcome $z$ experienced at date $t$

Preferences over the set of dated outcomes: indexed by the date at which the preferences are being considered:
$(z, 1) \succ_{0}\left(z^{\prime}, 2\right)$ means:

RESTRICTION: $(z, t) \succsim_{s}\left(z^{\prime}, t^{\prime}\right)$ implies that
$U_{s}$ utility function that represents the preferences at date $s$ :

When the preferences at time $s$ are restricted to outcomes to be experienced at time $s$ then simpler notation $u_{s}(z)$ :

$$
u_{s}(z)=
$$

Call $u_{s}(z)$ the instantaneous utility of $z$ at time $s$.

Begin with preferences at time 0 (the present): $\succsim_{0}$ represented by $U_{0}(\bullet)$. The discounted or exponential utility model assumes that these preferences have the following form:
(*)

$$
(z, t) \gtrsim_{0}\left(z^{\prime}, s\right) \text { if and only if }
$$

Example 1. $z=$ take online yoga class, $z^{\prime}=$ take in-person yoga class

$$
(z, 1) \sim_{0}\left(z^{\prime}, 3\right)
$$

If her preferences satisfy the discounted utility model then

Suppose that $u_{1}(z)=4$ and $u_{3}\left(z^{\prime}\right)=6$.

1. Then what is her discount factor?
2. What is her discount rate?

$$
U_{0}(z, t)=\delta^{t} u_{t}(z)
$$

Suppose you have a choice between $\left(z^{\prime}, 0\right),(z, 0)$ and $(z, 1)$
$z^{\prime}=$ do nothing and $\quad z=$ carry out a particular activity
$U_{0}\left(z^{\prime}, 0\right)=$
$U_{0}(z, 0)=$
$U_{0}(z, 1)=$
Suppose that $u_{0}\left(z^{\prime}\right)=0$ and $u_{1}(z)=u_{0}(z)$ so that $U_{0}(z, 1)=$

- $u_{0}(z)<\underbrace{0}_{=u_{0}\left(z^{\prime}\right)}$


$$
=u_{0}\left(z^{\prime}\right)
$$

- $u_{0}(z)>\underbrace{0}_{=u_{0}\left(z^{\prime}\right)}$

$=u_{0}\left(z^{\prime}\right)$


## Ranking sequence of outcomes



Suppose: $\quad u_{0}(x)=u_{1}(x)=4 \quad u_{0}(y)=u_{1}(y)=6 \quad \delta=0.8$.

|  | Today | Tomorrow |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| date | 0 | 1 |
| Plan $A$ |  |  |
| Plan $B$ |  |  |

Extension of the discounted utility:
$U_{0}(\operatorname{Plan} \mathrm{~A})=$
$U_{0}(\operatorname{Plan} \mathrm{~B})=$

EXAMPLE 3. | date | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Plan $A$ | $x$ | $y$ | $z$ |
| Plan $B$ | $y$ | $z$ | $x$ |

$U_{0}(\operatorname{Plan} \mathrm{~A})=$
$U_{0}(\operatorname{Plan} \mathrm{~B})=$
Suppose $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\delta=0.9, \\ u_{0}(x)=0, u_{1}(y)=4, u_{2}(z)=2, \\ u_{0}(y)=3, u_{1}(z)=1, u_{2}(x)=1\end{array}\right.$ then

$U_{0}(\operatorname{Plan} \mathrm{~A})=$
$U_{0}($ Plan B$)=$

## Time consistency of preferences

| date | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Plan $A$ | - | $x$ | $y$ | $z$ |
| Plan $B$ | - | $y$ | $z$ | $x$ |

Suppose that you "choose" Plan $B$ :

Now when date 1 comes along you re-examine those two plans and are free to change your mind (there was no commitment). Your preferences are time consistent if at date 1 you maintain the same ranking that you had at time 0 :

Recall

$$
U_{0}(z, t)=
$$

Extend this to the preferences at any time $s$ :

$$
U_{s}(z, t)=\quad \text { assuming that }
$$

$$
U_{s}(z, t)=\quad \text { assuming that } t \geq s
$$

|  | Date 0 | Date 1 | Date 2 | Date 3 | Date 4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Plan A | -- | -- | $x$ | $y$ | x |
| Plan B | -- | -- | y | z | x |
| $U_{0}(\operatorname{Plan} \mathrm{~A})=$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| $U_{1}(\operatorname{Plan} \mathrm{~A})=$ |  |  |  |  |  |

And similarly for the utility of Plan B.
Now suppose that at time 0 you prefer Plan A to Plan B:

Divide both sides of $\left({ }^{* *}\right)$ by $\delta$ :

Divide both sides of $\left({ }^{* *}\right)$ by $\delta^{2}$ :

