## People tend to be risk-averse towards gains, but risk-loving towards losses.

Can such an attitude be compatible with expected utility?

Choice between 
$$A:\begin{pmatrix} +\$50\\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
 and  $B:\begin{pmatrix} +\$100 & +\$0\\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$   $A > B$ 


Suppose that **she prefers** the sure gain: she prefers **A**. Then she displays **risk-aversion towards gains** (the expected value of these two options is the same).

Choice between 
$$C:\begin{pmatrix} -\$50\\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
 and  $D:\begin{pmatrix} -\$100 & -\$0\\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$ .

Suppose that **she prefers** the risky prospect: she prefers **D**. **Then she is risk-loving towards losses** (the expected value of these two options is the same).

Is there a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that is consistent with these choices?

Suppose that her initial wealth is \$100.



Hence it is possible for an expected-utility maximizing individual to display risk aversion towards a gain and risk love towards a symmetric loss.

a = 0.8  $2 \cdot a = 1.6$ b = 0.5 1+b = 1.5

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outcome \$200	normalizej 1	$C:\left( \begin{array}{c} \cdot \\ \cdot \end{array}  ight)$	$\begin{pmatrix} -\$50 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$ an	d	$D: \begin{pmatrix} -\$100 & -\$0 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}.$	
\$150 \$100 \$50	a b c		$\square \succ c$	2		
\$0	U	EVID	) > (	$\smile$	V(c) $V(so) = c$	
	-	- <u> </u> U(100) Z		-	V(36) = C	
T	$= \frac{1}{2}$		C		lbsc	C=0.2
I	70m [	J≻C i			b > 2c	0.570.4
í e	s it	is pos	sible	و	: for	

example a = 0.8b = 0.5c = 0.2

## However, this cannot happen at every wealth level.

Beginning wealth: \$200. Choice between 
$$A: \begin{pmatrix} +550 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$
 and  $B: \begin{pmatrix} +5100 & +50 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$ .  

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 250 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \qquad B = \begin{pmatrix} 350 & 200 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$$
Beginning wealth: \$200. Choice between  $C: \begin{pmatrix} -550 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$  and  $D: \begin{pmatrix} -5100 & -50 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$ .  

$$C = \begin{pmatrix} 150 \\ \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 160 & 200 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix}$$
Can she prefer A to B and also D to C? Let's see.  
Since she prefers D to C, she prefers  

$$D > C$$

$$E \cup (D) = \frac{1}{2} \cup (160) + \frac{1}{2} \cup (200) > E \cup (c) = \bigcup (150)$$

$$\frac{1}{2} \oplus \frac{1}{2} \oplus \frac{1}$$

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Thus people who are consistently (that is, at every initial level of wealth) riskaverse towards gains and risk-loving towards losses cannot satisfy the axioms of expected utility. If those axioms capture the notion of rationality, then those people are irrational.

# VALUE of INFORMATION

# The general case (non-monetary outcomes)

							V		$\mathbf{V}$
probability $\rightarrow$	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{3}{16}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$			utility		
	-	-			best	$Z_8$	96	X 100	9600
state $\rightarrow$	$S_1$	$S_2$	<i>S</i> <sub>3</sub>	$S_4$		$Z_4$	80	x (00	8000
act ↓						$Z_5$	48	× 100	4800
а	$Z_1$	7	$Z_3$	7.	suppose:	$Z_1, Z_2$	32	x 100	3200
_	21	$\boldsymbol{z}_2$	23	<b>-</b> 4		$Z_3, Z_6$	16	× IOU	1600
b	$Z_5$	$Z_6$	$Z_7$	$Z_8$	worst	$Z_7$	0	x 100	D

probability  $\rightarrow \frac{1}{16} \quad \frac{3}{16} \quad \frac{1}{2} \quad \frac{1}{4}$ state  $\rightarrow s_1 \quad s_2 \quad s_3 \quad s_4$ act  $\downarrow$ then  $a \quad 32 \quad 32 \quad 16 \quad 80$  $b \quad 48 \quad 16 \quad 0 \quad 96$ 

$$EU(a) = \frac{1}{16} 32 + \frac{3}{16} 32 + \frac{1}{2} 16 \frac{1}{4} 80 = 2 + 6 + 8 + 20 = 36$$
  

$$EU(b) = \frac{1}{16} 48 + \frac{3}{16} 16 + \frac{1}{96} 96 = 3 + 3 + 24 = 30$$
  
3600  
3000

probability $\rightarrow$	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{3}{16}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$
state $\rightarrow$	<i>S</i> <sub>1</sub>	$S_2$	<i>S</i> <sub>3</sub>	$S_4$
act $\downarrow$				
a	32	32	16	80
b	48	16	0	96

In the absence of further information.

 $\mathbb{E}[U(a)] = 36 \Leftarrow$ 



{ { S1}, { S2}, { S3}, { S4} }

Suppose now that the DM is offered perfect information for free.

probability $\rightarrow$	$\frac{1}{16}$	$\frac{3}{16}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	
state $\rightarrow$	<i>S</i> <sub>1</sub>	<i>S</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>S</i> <sub>3</sub>	<i>s</i> <sub>4</sub>	• If told $s_1$ she chooses <b>b</b> and gets utility <b>4 8</b>
act ↓					• If told $s_2$ she chooses $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ and gets utility <b>32</b>
a	32	32	16	80	• If told $s_3$ she chooses $c_1$ and gets utility $l_6$
b	48	16	0	96	• If told $s_4$ she chooses <b>b</b> and gets utility <b>76</b>
		I			

Her expected utility under free perfect information is  $48 + \frac{3}{16} + \frac{3}{16} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{$ 

from 3600 to 4100 = 500

 $F_{row} = 36 \text{ to } 41 = 5$ 

#### How to monetize the value of information in the general case

probability  $\rightarrow q \quad 1-q$ state  $\rightarrow s_1$  $S_{2}$ act  $\downarrow$ a  $y_1$  $y_2$ h  $y_3$  $\mathcal{Y}_{4}$ 

To avoid triviality let us assume that it is not the case that one act dominates the other.

Assume that

 $\gamma_1 = (z_1, W_1)$ 

 $\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{y_1} \\ \mathbf{y_3} \\ U(y_1) > U(y_3) \text{ and } U(y_4) > U(y_2) \end{array}$ 

Not enough to tell which act the DM would choose. Assume that he would choose act *a*:

$$qU(y_1) + (1-q)U(y_2) > qU(y_3) + (1-q)U(y_4)$$

What is the maximum price that the DM would be willing to pay for perfect information?

Each outcome  $y_i$  should be thought of a list of all the things that the DM cares about (wealth is just one of them). Separate from each  $y_i$  the wealth part and write the outcome as  $(z_i, W_i)$  where  $z_i$  is that part of  $y_i$  that does not refer to the DM's wealth and  $W_i$  is the DM's wealth in outcome  $y_i$ :

probability  $\rightarrow$ 1-qa state  $\rightarrow$  $S_1$  $S_2$ act  $\downarrow$  $(z_1, W_1) \quad (z_2, W_2)$ a  $(z_3, W_3) (z_4, W_4)$ b

 $U(z_1, w_1) > U(z_3, w_2)$ 

1F 1/2 × 13, 12 2 14

and at least one

Men a (wearly)

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dowincte,

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IF I have to pay \$p for perfect information

Our assumption is that  $U(y_1) > U(y_3)$  and  $U(y_4) > U(y_2)$  thus

 $U(z_1, W_1) > U(z_3, W_3)$  and  $U(z_4, W_4) > U(z_2, W_4)$ 

What would he choose if, having paid \$p for perfect information, he were informed that the state was  $s_1$ ? In general, we cannot infer from  $U(z_1, W_1) > U(z_3, W_3)$  that  $U(z_1, W_1 - p) > U(z_3, W_3 - p)$ . Assume this, however and, similarly,  $U(z_4, W_4 - p) > U(z_2, W_2 - p)$ . Then if informed that  $S_1$  the DM would choose  $^{\bigcirc}$  and if informed that  $s_2$  then he would choose  $^{\bigcirc}$ . Thus with perfect information his expected utility would be  $\mathcal{Q} \cup (\mathbb{Z}_1, \mathbb{W}_1 - \mathbb{P}) + (1 - \mathbb{Q}) \cup (\mathbb{Z}_4, \mathbb{W}_4, -\mathbb{P}) = \mathcal{Q} \cup (\mathbb{Z}_1, \mathbb{W}_1) + (1 - \mathbb{Q}) \cup (\mathbb{Z}_4, \mathbb{W}_4, -\mathbb{P})$  The maximum price the DM is willing to pay for perfect information is that value of p that solves the equation.

In Chapter 9 of the book (Section 9.3) there is a detailed (more complex) example along these lines.