## University of California, Davis -- Department of Economics

## **ECON 106: DECISION MAKING**

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## PRACTICE SECOND MIDTERM EXAM

**1.** Jennifer has the following vonNeumann-Morgenstern utility function:

$$U(x) = 200 - \left(12 - \frac{x}{1,000}\right)^2$$

where x denotes wealth measured in dollars. Jennifer's friend, Bob, is convinced that tomorrow it will rain while Jennifer thinks that there is a 75% probability that it will *not* rain. Bob is willing to take any bet and lets Jennifer name the stake. If the stake is, say, \$3000, then Bob will pay \$3000 to Jennifer if it does not rain and Jennifer will pay \$3000 to Bob if it rains. Jennifer's wealth is \$6000, and therefore she can bet any amount up to \$6000.

- (a) According to her beliefs, what is Jennifer's expected utility if she bets \$2,000?
- **(b)** According to her beliefs, what is her utility if she doesn't bet?
- (c) How much would she bet if she thought there were a 50% probability of rain?
- 2. Consider the following lotteries (the numbers in the top row are sums of money, measured in dollars, and the numbers in the bottom row are the respective probabilities):

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1000 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \qquad B = \begin{pmatrix} 5000 & 1000 & 0 \\ 0.1 & 0.89 & 0.01 \end{pmatrix} \qquad C = \begin{pmatrix} 1000 & 0 \\ 0.11 & 0.89 \end{pmatrix} \qquad D = \begin{pmatrix} 5000 & 0 \\ 0.1 & 0.9 \end{pmatrix}$$

(thus, for example, B says that with probability 0.1 you win \$5000, with probability 0.89 you win \$1000 and with probability 0.01 you win nothing). Peter's preferences are such that, between A and B he strictly prefers A, and between C and D he strictly prefers D. Does Peter satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory? (Assume that Peter prefers more money to less).

- **3.** You are a tax lawyer advising a client about a tax matter and don't know whether a particular tax deduction one that would save her \$80,000 is allowable (it's a judgment call that involves no ethical issues). If she takes the deduction, she'll be audited with probability 75% (she's in a group that's often audited for such deductions). Being audited involves legal expenses in the amount of \$10,000. If she's audited, the odds that the deduction will be found to be allowable are 50%. If she's audited and the deduction is disallowed, she won't obtain the \$80,000 benefit, and she'll have to pay a penalty of \$30,000.
  - (a) Draw a decision tree to represent your client's decision problem.
  - (b) Assuming that all your client cares about is her wealth (and prefers more wealth to less) and that she is risk neutral, should you advise her to claim the deduction?