


(5) Find the full-insurance contract, call it F , that lies on the isoprofit line that goes through contracts C and D and represent it in the wealth diagram.

$$W = 1600 \quad L = 360 \quad p = 1/12$$

$$h_C = 50, \quad d_C = 120$$



$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(C) &= 50 - \frac{1}{12}(360 - 120) \\ &= \boxed{30} \end{aligned}$$

$$F = (h_F, 0)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(F) &= h_F - \frac{1}{12}360 \\ &= h_F - 30 = 30 \\ h_F &= 60 \end{aligned}$$

any isoprofit line

(6) Calculate the slope of the isoprofit line through C in the wealth diagram.

$$-\frac{p}{1-p} = -\frac{\frac{1}{12}}{\frac{11}{12}} = -\frac{1}{11}$$

(7) Calculate the equation of the isoprofit line through C in the wealth diagram.

$$W_2 = a - \frac{1}{11} W_1 \quad a?$$

$$1550 = a - \frac{1}{11} 1430$$

$$a = 1,680$$

$$W_2 = 1,680 - \frac{1}{11} W_1$$

verify that this line goes through also points D and F

for F check that $1540 = 1680 - \frac{1}{11} 1540$

(8) Next prove that given two contracts $A = (h_A, d_A)$ and $B = (h_B, d_B)$, $\pi(A) = \pi(B)$ if and only if the expected value of the wealth lottery (for the insured) corresponding to contract A is equal to the expected value of the wealth lottery (for the insured) corresponding to contract B

FOR A RISK-NEUTRAL PERSON the indifference curve through A and B coincides with the isoprofit line through A and B

Consumer's point of view:

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} W - h_A & W - h_A - d_A \\ 1 - p & p \end{pmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} W - h_B & W - h_B - d_B \\ 1 - p & p \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E[A] &= (1-p)(W - h_A) + p(W - h_A - d_A) = \\ &= W - (1-p)h_A - ph_A - pd_A \\ &= W - h_A - pd_A \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} E[B] &= (1-p)(W - h_B) + p(W - h_B - d_B) = \\ &= W - (1-p)h_B - ph_B - pd_B \\ &= W - h_B - pd_B \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(A) &= h_A - p(L - d_A) = \\ &= h_A - pL + pd_A \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \pi(B) &= \\ &= h_B - pL + pd_B \end{aligned}$$

if and only if

$$h_A + pd_A = h_B + pd_B \quad (1)$$

subtract pL from both sides

$$h_A - pL + pd_A = h_B - pL + pd_B \quad (2)$$

$\pi(A)$ $\pi(B)$

$$\text{operation } O = \begin{pmatrix} \text{cured} & \text{permanent disability} \\ 90\% & 10\% \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\text{drug treatment } D = \begin{pmatrix} \text{cured} & \text{no benefit} & \text{adverse reaction} \\ 75\% & 10\% & 15\% \end{pmatrix}$$

What is the expected value of lottery O?

meaningless question!

What is the expected value of lottery D?

meaningless question!

Which of the two lotteries is better?

$$M = 4$$

$$Z = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} z_1 \\ \text{cured, permanent disability, adverse reaction to drug,} \\ \text{status quo} \\ z_4 \end{array} \right\}$$

EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY

$Z = \{z_1, z_2, \dots, z_m\}$ set of **basic** outcomes.

degenerate lottery
 $(z_1, z_2, z_3, \dots, z_m) \sim z_2$
 for every $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}$

A lottery is a probability distribution over Z : $L = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & \dots & z_m \\ p_1 & p_2 & \dots & p_m \end{pmatrix}$ $0 \leq p_i \leq 1$
 $p_1 + p_2 + \dots + p_m = 1$

Let L be the set of lotteries. Suppose that the agent has a ranking \succsim of the elements of L :

if $L = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & \dots & z_m \\ p_1 & p_2 & \dots & p_m \end{pmatrix}$ and $M = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & \dots & z_m \\ q_1 & q_2 & \dots & q_m \end{pmatrix}$ then

preference

$L \succ M$ means that L is considered to be better than M

$L \sim M$ means that L is considered to be just as good as M

indifference

$\begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & z_3 & \dots & z_m \\ \frac{1}{3} & \frac{2}{3} & 0 & \dots & 0 \end{pmatrix} \sim \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 \\ \frac{1}{3} & \frac{2}{3} \end{pmatrix}$

Rationality constraints on \succsim (von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms):

...

$$Z = \{ z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4, z_5 \}$$

$$z_4 \succ z_1 \succ z_2 \sim z_5 \succ z_3 \left| \begin{array}{ll} \text{best } z_4 & z_{\text{best}} \\ z_1 & \\ z_2, z_5 & \\ \text{Worst } z_3 & z_{\text{worst}} \end{array} \right.$$

Axiom: if $L = \begin{pmatrix} z_{\text{best}} & z_{\text{worst}} \\ p & 1-p \end{pmatrix}$

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} z_{\text{best}} & z_{\text{worst}} \\ q & 1-q \end{pmatrix}$$

$L \succ M$ if and only if $p > q$

$L \succsim M$ L is at least as good as M

Theorem 1 Let $Z = \{z_1, z_2, \dots, z_m\}$ be a set of basic outcomes and L the set of lotteries over Z . If \succsim satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms then there exists a function $U: Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, called a *von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function*, that assigns a number to

every basic outcome and is such that, for any two lotteries $L = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & \dots & z_m \\ p_1 & p_2 & \dots & p_m \end{pmatrix}$ and

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & \dots & z_m \\ q_1 & q_2 & \dots & q_m \end{pmatrix}, \rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} U(z_1) & U(z_2) & \dots & U(z_m) \\ q_1 & q_2 & & q_m \end{pmatrix} \quad \hookrightarrow \begin{pmatrix} U(z_1) & U(z_2) & \dots & U(z_m) \\ p_1 & p_2 & & p_m \end{pmatrix}$$

$$L \succ M \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \underbrace{p_1 U(z_1) + p_2 U(z_2) + \dots + p_m U(z_m)}_{\text{expected utility of lottery } L} > \underbrace{q_1 U(z_1) + q_2 U(z_2) + \dots + q_m U(z_m)}_{\text{expected utility of lottery } M}$$

and

$$L \sim M \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \underbrace{p_1 U(z_1) + p_2 U(z_2) + \dots + p_m U(z_m)}_{\text{expected utility of lottery } L} = \underbrace{q_1 U(z_1) + q_2 U(z_2) + \dots + q_m U(z_m)}_{\text{expected utility of lottery } M}$$

EXAMPLE 1. $Z = \{z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4\}$ $L = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & z_3 & z_4 \\ \frac{1}{8} & \frac{5}{8} & 0 & \frac{2}{8} \end{pmatrix}$ $M = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 & z_2 & z_3 & z_4 \\ \frac{1}{6} & \frac{2}{6} & \frac{1}{6} & \frac{2}{6} \end{pmatrix}$

Suppose we know that $U = \begin{cases} z_1 & z_2 & z_3 & z_4 \\ 6 & 2 & 8 & 1 \end{cases}$

Then

$$\mathbb{E}[U(L)] = \frac{1}{8} \cdot 6 + \frac{5}{8} \cdot 2 + 0 \cdot 8 + \frac{2}{8} \cdot 1 = 2.25$$

\wedge so $M \succ L$

$$\mathbb{E}[U(M)] = \frac{1}{6} \cdot 6 + \frac{2}{6} \cdot 2 + \frac{1}{6} \cdot 8 + \frac{2}{6} \cdot 1 = 3.33$$

EXAMPLE 2.

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} \text{paid 3-week vacation} & \text{no vacation} \\ 50\% & 50\% \end{pmatrix} \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} \text{paid 1-week vacation} \\ 100\% \end{pmatrix}$$

Suppose Ann says $B \succ A$ How would she rank

$$C = \begin{pmatrix} \text{paid 3-week vacation} & \text{no vacation} \\ 5\% & 95\% \end{pmatrix} \text{ and } D = \begin{pmatrix} \text{paid 1-week vacation} & \text{no vacation} \\ 10\% & 90\% \end{pmatrix} ?$$

Is it rational to say $B \succ A$
and $C \succ D$?