INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

LOGIC, GAME THEORY AND SOCIAL CHOICE 3
Certosa di Pontignano (Siena), September 11-14, 2003.

     Following LGS1 (Tilburg 1999) and LGS2 (St.Petersburg 2001), LGS3 aims to bring into focus the developing theoretical connections between logic and game theory, game theory and social choice, logic and social choice.


PROGRAM COMMITTEE

J.Abdou (Université de Paris I, France)
S. Barberà (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain)
G. Bonanno (University of California at Davis,USA)
V. Denicolò (Università di Bologna, Italy)
T.S.H. Driessen (University of Twente, The Netherlands)
E. Kalai (Northwestern University, USA)
M. Kaneko (University of Tsukuba, Japan)
H. Keiding (University of Copenhagen, Denmark)
G. van der Laan (Free University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
J.F. Laslier (Ecole Polytechnique, France)
M. Machover (University of London, UK)
V. Merlin (Université de Caen, France)
D. Mundici (Politecnico di Milano, Italy)
P. Odifreddi (Università di Torino, Italy)
G. Owen (Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, USA)
F. Patrone (Università di Genova, Italy)
B. Peleg (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel)
H. Peters (University of Maastricht, The Netherlands)
L. Petrosjan (State University of St. Petersburg, Russia)
G. Rosolini (Università di Genova, Italy)
M. Salles (Université de Caen, France)
H. de Swart (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)
W. Thomson (University of Rochester, USA)
S. Tijs (Tilburg University, The Netherlands)
A. Ursini (Università di Siena, Italy)
S. Vannucci (Università di Siena, Italy) (Chair)
J. Weymark (Vanderbilt University, USA)
E. Yanovskaya (State University of Petersburg, Russia)
D. Yeung (Baptist University, Hong Kong)



CONFERENCE  PROGRAM

Thursday, September 11
9:00-10:30  Parallel Sessions

Belief Modelling  (BM)
1)    Takashi Matsuhisa (Ibaraki National College of Technology):
      No Speculation under Rational Expectations in an Economy:
      A Multi-Modal Logic Approach
2)    K.J.Bernhard Neumaerker* (Ruhr-University), Gerald Pech (University of St.Andrews):
      The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability of the Fiscal Constitution
3)    Jean-Marc Tallon*, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (Université de Paris 1) and Shmuel Zamir  (ENSAE) :
      Contradicting Beliefs and Communication : The Static Case

Strategy-Proofness (SP)
1)    Stefan Maus (University of Maastricht):
      Minimally Manipulable Voting Rules
2)    Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (University of Alicante):
      Bankruptcy Rules and Coalitional Manipulation
3)    Hiroo Sasaki (Waseda University at Tokyo):
      Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peaked Preferences with
      Many Commodities

10:30-11:00  Coffee Break

11:00-12:30  Invited Lecture
        Bernard Monjardet (Université de Paris 1):
      Some Ordinal Dualities in Logic, Games and Choices

13:00   Lunch


14:30-16:00 Parallel Sessions

Freedom of Choice, Opportunity Rankings and Related Topics (FOR)
1)    Ruvin Gekker(National University of Ireland) and Martin Van Hees (University of Groningen):
      Freedom, Opportunity, and Uncertainty: A Logical Approach  
2)    Jorge Alcalde-Unzu* and, M.A. Ballester (Universidad Publica de Navarra):
      Equality of Opportunities: the Relative Difference Criterion
3)    Miguel A. Ballester* and Juan R. de Miguel (Universidad Publica de Navarra):
      An Alternative  Approach to Szpilrajn’s Theorem

Games and Intertemporal Decision Making  (GID)
1)    Nicola Dimitri (Università di Siena):
      Time Discounting and Time Consistency 
2)    Leon A. Petrosjan and Ekaterina Shevkoplyas* (St. Petersburg State University):
      The Time-Consistency Problem in Differential Cooperative Games with Random Duration
3)    Piotr Wiecek (University of Wroclaw):
      Continuous Convex Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation

16:00-16:30  Coffee Break

16:30-17:30 Tutorial
           Andranik Tangian (Fern-Universitat Hagen): Historical Background of the Mathematical    Theory of Democracy

17:30-19:30  Parallel Sessions

Characteristic Functions and Normal Form Games  (CFNF)
1)    Sergio Currarini (Università di Venezia) and Marco Marini* (Università di Urbino):
First Mover Advantage in NTU Cooperative Games with Externalities
2)    Gianfranco Gambarelli (Università di Bergamo):
      Transforming Games from Characteristic into Normal Form
3)    Fabrizio Germano (Universitat Pompeu Fabra):
      Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of Normal Form Games
4)    Laszlo Koczy (Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven):
      The Core in Normal Form Games

Values of Cooperative Games and Power Indices 1 (VCPI1)
1)   Annick Laruelle*, Federico Valenciano (Universidad del Pais Vasco):
        Bargaining, Voting and Value
2)   Natalia I. Naumova*, A.A. Nezderov (State University of St.Petersburg ):
         Nonsymmetric Values for NTU Games under Hart-MasColell Consistency
 3)   Agnieszka Rusinowska and Harrie de Swart (Tilburg University): Generalizing and
                Modifying the Hoede-Bakker Index
4)     Valery Vasil’ev (Sobolev Institute of Mathematics of Novosibirsk): Weber Polyhedron
                and Weighted Shapley Values


20:00   Dinner




Friday, September 12

9:00-10:30 Parallel Sessions

Implementation and Mechanism Design 1   (IMD1)
1)    Joseph Abdou* (Université de Paris 1) and Hans Keiding (University of Copenhagen):
      On Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Solvability of Game Forms  
2)    Bezalel Peleg (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Hans Peters* and Ton Storcken (University of Maastricht):
      Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences
3)    Anton Stefanescu*(University of Bucharest) and Massimiliano Ferrara (Università di Messina):
Implementation of Voting Operators

Values of Cooperative Games and Power Indices 2 (VCPI2)
1)    Francesc Carreras (Polytechnic University of Catalonia):
        The Effectiveness of Monotonic Systems
2)    Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano* (Universidad del Pais Vasco):
        Potential and ‘Power of a Collectivity to Act’’
3)    Honorata Sosnowska (Warszaw School of Economics):
        Values of Games with Apriori Unions. The Normalized Banzhaf Value

10:30-11:00 Coffee Break

11:00-12:30  Invited Lecture
       John Martin Hyland (University of Cambridge): Games and Logic: Composition of Strategies

13:00      Lunch

14:30-17:00 Parallel Sessions

      Logical and Category-Theoretic Approaches to Games and Solution Concepts   (LCA)
1)    Corrado Benassi, Paolo Gentilini (Università di Bologna, CNR Genova):
      Can a Nash Equilibrium be Known ?
2)    Adam Galambos (University of Minnesota) :
      Revealed Preference and Game Theory
3)    Hidetoshi Tashiro (Hitotsubashi University):
      Computability of Nash Equilibrium
4)    Victor Lapitsky (Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg):
      A Categorial Approach to Optimality in Non-Cooperative Games
5)    Stefano Vannucci (Università di Siena):
      On Game Formats and Chu Spaces

Voting Procedures and Electoral Processes 1  (VPEP 1)
1)  Salvador Barberà*(Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) and Matthew O. Jackson (California
Institute of Technology):
The Weights of Nations: Assigning Weights to Heterogeneous Voters
      2)  Steven Brams (New York University) and M. Remzi Sanver* (Bilgi University):
   Voter  Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
      3)  William Gehrlein (University of Delaware):
           Condorcet Efficiency and Proximity to Single-Peaked Preferences
      4)   Rafael Hortala-Vallve (London School of Economics):
     Qualitative Voting
      5)  Jean-Francois Laslier and Karine Van der Straeten* (Ecole Polytechnique de Paris):
           Approval Voting : An Experiment During the French 2002 Electoral Competition

18:00  Excursion to Siena and Dinner



Saturday, September 13
9:00-10:30 Parallel Sessions

Coalitions and Network Formation   (CNF)
1)    Robert  P. Gilles* (Virginia Polytechnic) and Sudipta Sarangi (Louisiana State University):
The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation
2)    Herman Monsuur (RN Naval College):
       Centrality and Network Dynamics
3)    Agnieszka Rusinowska and Harrie de Swart (Tilburg University) :
       Negotiating a Stable Government: An Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition
       Formation Model

Implementation and Mechanism Design 2   (IMD2)
1) Ottorino Chillemi (Università di Padova):
      Cross-Owned Firms Competing in Auctions
4)    Jernej Copic(California Institute of Technology) and Clara Ponsati*(Universitat Autonoma
de Barcelona):       Implementation by Decent Mechanisms
3)  Matthew O. Jackson*(California Institute of Technology) and Hugo Sonnenschein (University of Chicago):
      The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency


10:30-11:00 Coffee Break


11:00-12:30  Invited Lecture
Johan Van Benthem (Universities of Amsterdam and Stanford): Rational Dynamics and Epistemic Logic in Games

13:00   Lunch

15:00-17:00
 
Solution Concepts for TU-Games  (STU)
1)    Javier Arin (University of the Basque Country ):
      Egalitarian Distributions in Coalitional Models: The Lorenz Criterion
2)    Gerard van der Laan*, Renè van den Brink /Free University of Amsterdam) and Valery Vasil’ev (University of Novosibirsk):
      Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends in Line-Graph Games
3)    Vincent Merlin* (Université de Caen) and Fabrice Valognes (Université du Havre):
       Discrepancies among TU-Games Solutions
4)    Elena Yanovskaya (State University of St.Petersburg):
      Nonsymmetric Consistent Surplus Sharing Methods

17:00-17:30  Coffee Break

17:30-18:30  Tutorial
          Maurice Salles* (Université de Caen) and Michael Barrett (University of Birmingham): Social Choice with Fuzzy Preferences

18:30    Meeting of LGS3 Program Committee Members

20:00   Social Dinner


     
Sunday, September 14

9:00-10:30 Invited Lecture
Dov Samet (University of Tel Aviv): One Observation Behind Two Envelope Puzzles


10:30-11:00  Coffee Break

11:00-13:30 Parallel Sessions 

Axiomatizing Social Choice Rules  (ASCR)
1)    Eyal Beigman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem):
      Extension of Arrow’s Theorem to Symmetric Sets of Tournaments
2)    Dinko Dimitrov*(University of  Amsterdam), Shao-Ching Sun (Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology at Ishikawa) and Yongsheng Xu (Georgia State University):  
      Procedural Group Identification
3)    Reiko Gotoh (NIPSS Tokyo), Kotaro Suzumura (Hitotsubashi University) and Naoki Yoshihara* (University of Yale):
On the Libertarian Assignments of  Individual Rights 
4)    Herrade Igersheim (Université Louis Pasteur de Strasbourg):
      From the Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal to a Model of Metaranking of Preferences
5)    Orguz Kibris* (Sabanci University) and M.Sertel (Koc University, Istanbul) :
      Bargaining over a  Finite Set of Alternatives

Voting Procedures and Electoral Processes 2 (VPEP2)
        1) Marcello Basili (Università di Siena) and Fulvio Fontini (Università di Firenze) :
     Ambiguity in Citizens-Politicians Interactions
        2) Paulo P. Corte-Real (Universidade Nova de Lisboa):
   Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes
        3) Jean-Francois Laslier (Ecole Polytechnique de Paris):
     Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
         4) Jerome Mathis ( Université de Cergy-Pontoise) :
      A Model of Debate : On the Effectiveness of Voting Rules After Deliberation
         5) Gerald Pech (University of St.Andrews):
  A Coalition Dominance Approach to Party Behaviour and the Moderating Effect of
  Proportional Representation

13:30 Lunch
 

Conference website (see http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/lgs3/ )