INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
LOGIC, GAME THEORY AND SOCIAL CHOICE 3
Certosa di Pontignano (Siena), September
11-14, 2003.
Following LGS1 (Tilburg 1999) and LGS2 (St.Petersburg
2001), LGS3 aims to bring into focus the developing theoretical connections
between logic and game theory, game theory and social choice, logic and social
choice.
PROGRAM COMMITTEE
J.Abdou (Université de Paris I, France)
S. Barberà (Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain)
G. Bonanno (University
of California at Davis,USA)
V. Denicolò
(Università di Bologna, Italy)
T.S.H. Driessen
(University of Twente, The Netherlands)
E. Kalai (Northwestern University,
USA)
M. Kaneko (University
of Tsukuba, Japan)
H. Keiding (University
of Copenhagen, Denmark)
G. van der Laan
(Free University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
J.F. Laslier (Ecole
Polytechnique, France)
M. Machover (University
of London, UK)
V. Merlin (Université
de Caen, France)
D. Mundici (Politecnico
di Milano, Italy)
P. Odifreddi (Università
di Torino, Italy)
G. Owen (Naval
Postgraduate School at Monterey, USA)
F. Patrone (Università
di Genova, Italy)
B. Peleg (Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Israel)
H. Peters (University
of Maastricht, The Netherlands)
L. Petrosjan (State
University of St. Petersburg, Russia)
G. Rosolini (Università
di Genova, Italy)
M. Salles (Université
de Caen, France)
H. de Swart (Tilburg
University, The Netherlands)
W. Thomson (University of Rochester,
USA)
S. Tijs (Tilburg University,
The Netherlands)
A. Ursini (Università
di Siena, Italy)
S. Vannucci (Università
di Siena, Italy) (Chair)
J. Weymark (Vanderbilt
University, USA)
E. Yanovskaya
(State University of Petersburg, Russia)
D. Yeung (Baptist
University, Hong Kong)
CONFERENCE PROGRAM
Thursday, September 11
9:00-10:30 Parallel Sessions
Belief Modelling (BM)
1) Takashi Matsuhisa (Ibaraki National College of Technology):
No Speculation under Rational Expectations
in an Economy:
A Multi-Modal Logic Approach
2) K.J.Bernhard Neumaerker* (Ruhr-University), Gerald
Pech (University of St.Andrews):
The Role of Beliefs for the Sustainability
of the Fiscal Constitution
3) Jean-Marc Tallon*, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (Université
de Paris 1) and Shmuel Zamir (ENSAE) :
Contradicting Beliefs and Communication :
The Static Case
Strategy-Proofness (SP)
1) Stefan Maus (University of Maastricht):
Minimally Manipulable Voting Rules
2) Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (University of Alicante):
Bankruptcy Rules and Coalitional Manipulation
3) Hiroo Sasaki (Waseda University at Tokyo):
Limitation of Efficiency: Strategy-Proofness
and Single-Peaked Preferences with
Many Commodities
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-12:30 Invited Lecture
Bernard Monjardet (Université
de Paris 1):
Some Ordinal Dualities in Logic, Games and
Choices
13:00 Lunch
14:30-16:00 Parallel Sessions
Freedom of Choice, Opportunity Rankings and Related Topics (FOR)
1) Ruvin Gekker(National University of Ireland) and Martin
Van Hees (University of Groningen):
Freedom, Opportunity, and Uncertainty: A
Logical Approach
2) Jorge Alcalde-Unzu* and, M.A. Ballester (Universidad
Publica de Navarra):
Equality of Opportunities: the Relative Difference
Criterion
3) Miguel A. Ballester* and Juan R. de Miguel (Universidad
Publica de Navarra):
An Alternative Approach to Szpilrajn’s
Theorem
Games and Intertemporal Decision Making (GID)
1) Nicola Dimitri (Università di Siena):
Time Discounting and Time Consistency
2) Leon A. Petrosjan and Ekaterina Shevkoplyas* (St. Petersburg
State University):
The Time-Consistency Problem in Differential
Cooperative Games with Random Duration
3) Piotr Wiecek (University of Wroclaw):
Continuous Convex Stochastic Games of Capital
Accumulation
16:00-16:30 Coffee Break
16:30-17:30 Tutorial
Andranik Tangian
(Fern-Universitat Hagen): Historical Background of the Mathematical
Theory of Democracy
17:30-19:30 Parallel Sessions
Characteristic Functions and Normal Form Games (CFNF)
1) Sergio Currarini (Università di Venezia) and
Marco Marini* (Università di Urbino):
First Mover Advantage in NTU Cooperative Games with Externalities
2) Gianfranco Gambarelli (Università di Bergamo):
Transforming Games from Characteristic into
Normal Form
3) Fabrizio Germano (Universitat Pompeu Fabra):
Some Geometry and Equivalence Classes of
Normal Form Games
4) Laszlo Koczy (Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven):
The Core in Normal Form Games
Values of Cooperative Games and Power Indices 1 (VCPI1)
1) Annick Laruelle*, Federico Valenciano (Universidad del Pais
Vasco):
Bargaining, Voting and Value
2) Natalia I. Naumova*, A.A. Nezderov (State University of St.Petersburg
):
Nonsymmetric Values for
NTU Games under Hart-MasColell Consistency
3) Agnieszka Rusinowska and Harrie de Swart (Tilburg University):
Generalizing and
Modifying the Hoede-Bakker Index
4) Valery Vasil’ev (Sobolev Institute of Mathematics
of Novosibirsk): Weber Polyhedron
and Weighted Shapley Values
20:00 Dinner
Friday, September 12
9:00-10:30 Parallel Sessions
Implementation and Mechanism Design 1 (IMD1)
1) Joseph Abdou* (Université de Paris 1) and Hans
Keiding (University of Copenhagen):
On Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Solvability of Game Forms
2) Bezalel Peleg (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Hans
Peters* and Ton Storcken (University of Maastricht):
Constitutional Implementation of Social Choice
Correspondences
3) Anton Stefanescu*(University of Bucharest) and Massimiliano
Ferrara (Università di Messina):
Implementation of Voting Operators
Values of Cooperative Games and Power Indices 2 (VCPI2)
1) Francesc Carreras (Polytechnic University of Catalonia):
The Effectiveness of Monotonic
Systems
2) Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano* (Universidad
del Pais Vasco):
Potential and ‘Power of a Collectivity
to Act’’
3) Honorata Sosnowska (Warszaw School of Economics):
Values of Games with Apriori
Unions. The Normalized Banzhaf Value
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-12:30 Invited Lecture
John Martin Hyland (University of Cambridge):
Games and Logic: Composition of Strategies
13:00 Lunch
14:30-17:00 Parallel Sessions
Logical and Category-Theoretic Approaches
to Games and Solution Concepts (LCA)
1) Corrado Benassi, Paolo Gentilini (Università
di Bologna, CNR Genova):
Can a Nash Equilibrium be Known ?
2) Adam Galambos (University of Minnesota) :
Revealed Preference and Game Theory
3) Hidetoshi Tashiro (Hitotsubashi University):
Computability of Nash Equilibrium
4) Victor Lapitsky (Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg):
A Categorial Approach to Optimality in Non-Cooperative
Games
5) Stefano Vannucci (Università di Siena):
On Game Formats and Chu Spaces
Voting Procedures and Electoral Processes 1 (VPEP 1)
1) Salvador Barberà*(Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) and
Matthew O. Jackson (California
Institute of Technology):
The Weights of Nations: Assigning Weights to Heterogeneous Voters
2) Steven Brams (New York University)
and M. Remzi Sanver* (Bilgi University):
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
3) William Gehrlein (University of
Delaware):
Condorcet Efficiency
and Proximity to Single-Peaked Preferences
4) Rafael Hortala-Vallve (London
School of Economics):
Qualitative Voting
5) Jean-Francois Laslier and Karine
Van der Straeten* (Ecole Polytechnique de Paris):
Approval Voting
: An Experiment During the French 2002 Electoral Competition
18:00 Excursion to Siena and Dinner
Saturday, September 13
9:00-10:30 Parallel Sessions
Coalitions and Network Formation (CNF)
1) Robert P. Gilles* (Virginia Polytechnic) and
Sudipta Sarangi (Louisiana State University):
The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation
2) Herman Monsuur (RN Naval College):
Centrality and Network Dynamics
3) Agnieszka Rusinowska and Harrie de Swart (Tilburg University)
:
Negotiating a Stable Government: An
Application of Bargaining Theory to a Coalition
Formation Model
Implementation and Mechanism Design 2 (IMD2)
1) Ottorino Chillemi (Università di Padova):
Cross-Owned Firms Competing in Auctions
4) Jernej Copic(California Institute of Technology) and
Clara Ponsati*(Universitat Autonoma
de Barcelona): Implementation by Decent Mechanisms
3) Matthew O. Jackson*(California Institute of Technology) and Hugo
Sonnenschein (University of Chicago):
The Linking of Collective Decisions and Efficiency
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-12:30 Invited Lecture
Johan Van Benthem (Universities of Amsterdam and Stanford): Rational Dynamics
and Epistemic Logic in Games
13:00 Lunch
15:00-17:00
Solution Concepts for TU-Games (STU)
1) Javier Arin (University of the Basque Country ):
Egalitarian Distributions in Coalitional
Models: The Lorenz Criterion
2) Gerard van der Laan*, Renè van den Brink /Free
University of Amsterdam) and Valery Vasil’ev (University of Novosibirsk):
Distribution of Harsanyi Dividends in Line-Graph
Games
3) Vincent Merlin* (Université de Caen) and Fabrice
Valognes (Université du Havre):
Discrepancies among TU-Games Solutions
4) Elena Yanovskaya (State University of St.Petersburg):
Nonsymmetric Consistent Surplus Sharing Methods
17:00-17:30 Coffee Break
17:30-18:30 Tutorial
Maurice Salles* (Université
de Caen) and Michael Barrett (University of Birmingham): Social Choice with
Fuzzy Preferences
18:30 Meeting of LGS3 Program Committee Members
20:00 Social Dinner
Sunday, September 14
9:00-10:30 Invited Lecture
Dov Samet (University of Tel Aviv): One Observation Behind Two Envelope
Puzzles
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-13:30 Parallel Sessions
Axiomatizing Social Choice Rules (ASCR)
1) Eyal Beigman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem):
Extension of Arrow’s Theorem to Symmetric
Sets of Tournaments
2) Dinko Dimitrov*(University of Amsterdam), Shao-Ching
Sun (Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology at Ishikawa) and Yongsheng
Xu (Georgia State University):
Procedural Group Identification
3) Reiko Gotoh (NIPSS Tokyo), Kotaro Suzumura (Hitotsubashi
University) and Naoki Yoshihara* (University of Yale):
On the Libertarian Assignments of Individual Rights
4) Herrade Igersheim (Université Louis Pasteur
de Strasbourg):
From the Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal
to a Model of Metaranking of Preferences
5) Orguz Kibris* (Sabanci University) and M.Sertel (Koc
University, Istanbul) :
Bargaining over a Finite Set of Alternatives
Voting Procedures and Electoral Processes 2 (VPEP2)
1) Marcello Basili (Università
di Siena) and Fulvio Fontini (Università di Firenze) :
Ambiguity in Citizens-Politicians Interactions
2) Paulo P. Corte-Real (Universidade
Nova de Lisboa):
Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes
3) Jean-Francois Laslier (Ecole
Polytechnique de Paris):
Ambiguity in Electoral Competition
4) Jerome Mathis ( Université
de Cergy-Pontoise) :
A Model of Debate : On the Effectiveness
of Voting Rules After Deliberation
5) Gerald Pech (University
of St.Andrews):
A Coalition Dominance Approach to Party Behaviour and the Moderating
Effect of
Proportional Representation
13:30 Lunch
Conference website (see
http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/lgs3/
)